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A tale of Ospreys and Trout - Part II(A): A journey beneath the waves

Writer: Arjun Prakash Iyer
Arjun Prakash Iyer
3 days ago
8 min read

Updated: 2 days ago

The first part of the article covered the great predator-prey rivalry between the Osprey and the Trout, albeit only from the ‘bird’s-eye view’. It would be very unfair of me, as a historian, to give a ‘one-sided’ perspective of the tale. Sitting opposite the Tupolev Tu-142 Museum along the R.K. Beach Promenade is the protagonist of today’s story - a unique exhibit and the first of its kind anywhere in Asia. This exhibit is going to represent the perspective of the fish in this article.


As one enters R.K. Beach, one’s eyes will not drift towards the crashing waves along the shore, but towards a glossy black structure at the beach entrance. She’s not a building, she’s not a vehicle… She’s a relic of a certain kind of metal shark, the awareness of whose phantom presence used to make her enemies shiver.


Image: INS Kursura museum as seen in 2019. Credits: CC-BY-SA 4.0/Tarunsamanta
Image: INS Kursura museum as seen in 2019. Credits: CC-BY-SA 4.0/Tarunsamanta

Gracefully sitting on a concrete slab, she’s INS Kursura (S20), Asia’s first submarine museum, with the distinction of being allowed to retain the title Indian Naval Ship. (The INS designation is given when a ship is commissioned and removed once it is decommissioned.)


So, how did this submarine, which is supposed to be diving beneath the waves, end up beached? Before we get to answering the question, we have to understand the Indian Navy’s journey towards procuring its first submarines to truly appreciate INS Kursura and her sister ships. With that, we continue to develop on the same spirit as my previous article.


Indian Navy’s journey beneath the waves

The Royal Indian Navy, by definition of its role, was never expected to develop a submarine arm. Until then, training in India was limited in scope and focused on Anti-Submarine (A/S), Gunnery, Logistics, Mechanical and (T) duties, with most of these establishments located in the Bombay and Sindh regions.


It was only in the aftermath of the Second World War and with the advent of Plans Paper No.1 (keeping in mind the Axis expedition into the Indian Ocean and the experiences gained in repelling such campaigns) that a proposal to induct submarines was made as part of the RIN’s expansion.


Senior officers had forwarded a proposal to the then C-in-C RIN, Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Audley Miles KCB, KCSI, stating that the RIN would require a flotilla of “no less than 16 submarines”, with the estimated cost of one boat being £500,000 (₹66 lakh at the 1947 conversion rate). Plans were also made to set up a submarine training school.


However, the independence of India meant that the Indian Government had to redraw its plans. The original Paper of 1946 evolved into the "Outline Plan for the Reorganisation and Development of the Royal Indian Navy", which was first vetted at Naval HQ on 25 August 1947. However, the new Paper reduced the number of submarines from 16 to just four. The estimated time for execution, too, was reduced from a decade to just six years.


Budgetary constraints and rising misconceptions that the submarine was ill-suited to the Indian Navy also played a role, ultimately resulting in none being procured. The Indian Government felt that submarines violated its ideology of non-aggression and Ahimsa, and would tarnish the image of the force itself. Furthermore, the RIN/IN apex consisted of few RN officers on deputation, which led to fostering of certain discouraging beliefs that the Indian Navy’s ranks were insufficiently qualified to handle a vessel as ‘sophisticated’ as a submarine.


Renewed effort to procure submarines

Efforts to raise a submarine arm took off only in 1958, with Vice Admiral Ram Dass Katari becoming the Chief of Naval Staff. By that point, India had drastically fallen behind the rest of the world. The advent of nuclear propulsion, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and the improved performance of conventional submarines themselves all gave the Indian Navy a taste of reality.  


In 1960, a decision to send one Captain and eight junior officers to the United Kingdom for submarine training was implemented. The first batch of five officers comprised Captain (later Commodore) B.K. Dang, who would later establish the nucleus of the Submarine Arm; Lieutenant Commander K.S. Subramanian; and Lieutenants M.N. Vasudeva, R.J. Millan and A. Auditto, all from the Executive Branch. They were sent to the Royal Navy’s submarine school Dolphin, off Portsmouth. The second batch of four officers, Lieutenant Commander M.N.R. Samant, Lieutenants V.S. Shekhawat, S.K. Singh and P.K. Ramanathan, was sent to Dolphin in July 1963. A number of ratings were also sent to the UK for training. By 1965, a total of 15 officers and 20 ratings had successfully completed their training in the UK. 


Continued efforts at persuasion which also coincided with the deterioratng Sino-Indian relations, and the ensuing war in 1962 convinced the Government to sanction the raising of the submarine arm. The first half of the 1960s marked the rising importance of the Bay of Bengal. Hypothetical scenarios of intervention by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) during the 1962 war, rising disputes between India and Indonesia over the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the latter’s support for Pakistan during the 1965 war, and Pakistan’s own procurement of the PNS Ghazi all played an important role in shaping the decision.


Making the right choice

The Indian officers and ratings performed exceedingly well and earned the genuine respect of their British counterparts. Upon returning to India in 1963, Captain Dang drafted a white paper laying down the following criteria for submarine selection: to acquire at least three submarines with an operating cycle of three weeks (two weeks for transit to and from a designated patrol area at least 1,500 nautical miles from port, with endurance for one week of patrolling); long endurance allowing for operations from the Strait of Malacca in the east to Bab-el-Mandeb in the west; and a rugged and reliable submarine with duplication of key equipment, comprehensive safety features and sufficient safe buoyancy.


The evaluated options included British T-, Porpoise and Oberon classes; unspecified American fleet-class submarines (likely Tench- or Tang-class); French Daphné and Narval classes; German Baltic-class; Soviet Whiskey and Zulu classes (which, incidentally, were the predecessors of the Foxtrot-class); and a few Italian and Dutch models. 


The Dutch, Italian and German models were deemed too small and technically unsuitable for the Indian Navy. The French boats were technologically modern but lacked range. (Interestingly, Pakistan would buy the Daphné class and commission its first boat, PNS Hangor, in 1970). The Americans refused to sell their Tench/Tang-class submarines owing to India’s geopolitical stance, and, more importantly, their existing assistance to Pakistan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), under which they had already leased the PNS Ghazi.  


The primary options came to British submarines. The Indian Navy insisted on purchasing the Porpoise or Oberon class; however, the Royal Navy was not willing to lease any boats. Instead, they insisted on selling the older T-Class submarines (which were of WW2 vintage), which Captain Dang described as “suffering from metallic rheumatism and arthritis” and “on the verge of being sent to the shipbreaker’s yard”. The Royal Navy’s Admiralty was open to building and selling modified Oberon boats; however, they were not open to selling them on a credit-line basis, which happened to be the payment plan sought by the Indian Navy owing to its shortage of funds and the contemporary economic condition of the country. 


Image: A collage of images showing the submarines evaluated by the Indian Navy during the period [Clockwise, from Top Left] British Triton-class (Public Domain Image), British Oberon-class (CC-BY-SA 3.0/Bukvoed), U.S. Tang-class (PICRYL), U.S. Tench-class (CC-BY-SA 2.0/Marinha do Brasil), French Daphné-class (U.S. Navy), French Narval-class (CC-BY-SA 4.0/800tonnesNavalArt), Soviet Whiskey-class (Public Domain), Soviet Zulu-class (CC-BY-SA 3.0/Anrie)
Image: A collage of images showing the submarines evaluated by the Indian Navy during the period [Clockwise, from Top Left] British Triton-class (Public Domain Image), British Oberon-class (CC-BY-SA 3.0/Bukvoed), U.S. Tang-class (PICRYL), U.S. Tench-class (CC-BY-SA 2.0/Marinha do Brasil), French Daphné-class (U.S. Navy), French Narval-class (CC-BY-SA 4.0/800tonnesNavalArt), Soviet Whiskey-class (Public Domain), Soviet Zulu-class (CC-BY-SA 3.0/Anrie)

Selection of the Foxtrot-class

On the evening of 15 February 1964, the Soviet Ambassador to India, Ivan Benediktov, called upon the then Prime Minister of India, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, to discuss the advancement of Indo-Soviet relations in light of increasing ‘polemics’ by the PRC. This discussion led to an opportunity for India to send a high-level delegation to the USSR. 


In August–September 1964, a high-level delegation of Indian politicians and military officers, under the leadership of the then Defence Minister, Shri Y.B. Chavan, visited the USSR. The delegation also included General J.N. Chaudhuri (the Chief of the Army Staff), Mr T.N. Kaul (Indian Ambassador to the USSR) and Shri H.C. Sarin (Additional Defence Secretary).  


This trip marked the first time a naval team was ever included in an Indian defence delegation. The key personnel included then Rear Admiral S.M. Nanda (Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff), Captain (later Rear Admiral) C.L. Bhandari (technical member of the naval team) and Captain B. K. Dang (Director of Weapon, Policy & Tactics).


The visit was perhaps the largest to date, during which key agreements were signed around the acquisition of 130-mm medium guns, PT-76 amphibious tanks and more MiG-21 fighter aircraft, along with licence-manufacturing rights and Transfer of Technology. The visit also laid the groundwork for the Foxtrot-class submarine, Petya-class frigates and other naval acquisitions. 


After being shown the Whiskey and Zulu classes (which were promptly rejected by the Indian Navy owing to prior capability and intelligence estimates), the delegation was shown drawings and technical specifications of the Project 641 submarine in Moscow. The type, known as the Foxtrot-class by NATO, was far more capable than the earlier two types. In fact, the Cuban Missile Crisis, which had occurred just two years earlier, revolved around how four of these boats sailed all the way to the East Coast of the USA with nuclear weapons! 


Satisfied with the specifications, the naval team was taken by hydroplane off Leningrad (St Petersburg) harbour, where they carried out a comprehensive walk-around and evaluation of the submarine, following which they undertook a ‘test dive’ to 50 metres to gain first-hand experience of the submarine’s operations. The Foxtrot-class was deemed a suitable selection owing to its comparable characteristics and specifications to those of the Porpoise/Oberon-class. Its hull construction was deemed more suitable for the tropical climate of the Indian subcontinent.


Image: List of naval arms transfers between the erstwhile USSR and India from 1965-71. Credits: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult 
Image: List of naval arms transfers between the erstwhile USSR and India from 1965-71. Credits: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database https://armstransfers.sipri.org/ArmsTransfer/CSVResult 

In August–September 1965, a delegation led by Shri G.L. Sheth (Additional Secretary), including Rear Admiral S.N. Kohli (Deputy Chief of Naval Staff), Captains Dang, Bhandari and K.R. Ramnath, and Dr. Paramanandhan (Director of Naval Design), travelled to Moscow to negotiate prices and sign the formal contract. The terms of the contract specified the supply of four submarines, with the first delivery by late 1967 and one submarine being delivered every year thereafter.


Image: Kalvari-class submarine of the Indian Navy. Credit: Indian Navy
Image: Kalvari-class submarine of the Indian Navy. Credit: Indian Navy

The acquisition was also accompanied by a favourable credit policy offered by the Soviets. The price of one submarine was ₹2.5 crore, in comparison to ₹5 crore for the Oberon-class.* Repayment was to be made over a period of 10 years, with an interest rate of only 2% per annum. What made it interesting was the relative flexibility in payment, which allowed India to pay in rupees or even barter! The package also included training two full batches of crew in the USSR.


[*Prices and specifications quoted by open-source publications may or may not be accurate to the actual costs stated in the contract sub-clauses, owing to confidentiality.]


With this, the Indian Navy, after many trials and tribulations, acquired its submarine arm! The first batch of four Foxtrots (named the Kalvari-class in India) was followed by four more improved Foxtrot boats (Pr.641E, also known as the Vela-class) in 1971 to further expand India’s submarine arm. The purchase was made in time for Indian boats to participate in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War.


The Foxtrots would go on to make a significant contribution during their 44-year-long service to the Indian Navy, which (along with a lot more!) will be covered in the next instalment of this series.


Arjun Prakash Iyer


Arjun Prakash Iyer is a 24 year old Research Scholar under the Unni Kartha Chair of Excellence (UKCOE), chaired by CAPSS. A graduate in Journalism, he studies contemporary defence issues through the lens of military history and is currently researching the role and service history of the MiG-23 and MiG-27 in the IAF. He is also a research associate at Meluha Maritime.


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