Why the Phython's choke was just as deadly as the Trident's strike

(Author’s Note. At the very outset I would like to state unambiguously that nothing in this article even remotely distracts from the splendid achievements of Op Trident or is to be construed, in any manner, as being disrespectful to those involved in Op Trident. My own writings, talks and social media posts, over many years, have consistently highlighted Op Trident and its significance. The only objective in this article is to bring out the many facets of Op Python which has receded from naval and public memory.)

INS Nipat (K86)

The Opening Salvo

By now, the salient aspects of Op Trident and Op Python are known and do not bear repetition especially in the Killers’ journal. The twin attacks on Karachi, on 04 and 08 Dec 1971, have become the stuff of legend because they encapsulated daring, chutzpah, drama, action and varied characters; verily, all the elements that make for a great story. However, over the years, due to many factors Op Trident has loomed large in public imagination. In podcasts that I was part of, in discussions with few filmmakers and OTT folks who wanted to make movies/episodes on the Navy, in exchanges with curious civilian folks, in conversations with media or others interested in the Navy, the interactions focused on Op Trident and Trident alone. One reason for this could be the diminished attention span of audiences, younger generation especially, and people at large. If everything has to be served bite sized in just few minutes, the natural tendency is to focus on one (or few) theme/s. The second reason could be that Op Trident is concurrent with the Navy Day and, hence, gets more eye balls and sound bites. The third could be that we in the Navy have not made sufficient attempts to ‘inform the environment’ about the other operations of the ‘71’ war, including Op Python.

First things first. Though it has been said before it bears saying again that the 1971 war was Indian Navy’s finest hour. The Navy fought in two separate theatres and established sea control in both the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Its ships and aircraft sunk enemy ships, destroyed shore infrastructure and completely dominated the Pakistan Navy (PN). It’s effective ‘blockade’ of both enemy coasts closed avenues of escape by sea and resulted in surrender of more than 90000 Pakistani combatants. Many units and personnel of Indian Navy (IN) covered themselves with glory in this war. It was a war that saw many missions – surface strike, AA, ASW, Submarine Ops, riverine raid, coastal defence, saboteur ops, amphibious ops which were well enmeshed with deception plans, tactical ruses, innovation and op logistics. Inter service coordination, sound planning at all echelons, wargaming and good leadership at strategic, operational and tactical levels played a very important role. There were problems, errors, defects, communication gaps and snafus too and many of them offer lessons for the future. However, overall, we essayed a remarkable campaign and emerged triumphant.

What the Navy Day actually celebrates

While the devastating attacks on Karachi on 04 and 08 Dec 71 were the events that most captured public imagination then, and have remained etched in memory ever since, the Navy’s other key operations/campaigns/actions included the Eastern Fleet operations in the Bay of Bengal led by INS Vikrant, the Western Fleet Operations in the Arabian Sea with INS Mysore as the Flagship, the largely unknown but stunningly successful special operations in East Pakistan (Op X), the noteworthy deception and artful operational manoeuvre that led to the sinking of PNS Ghazi and the poignant loss of INS Khukri. That besides, many other smaller scale or lesser known operations such as the deployment of our submarines, deployment of survey ships for towing and other support, deployment of auxiliaries, action off Kochi by Southern Naval Area (now SNC), the involvement of NOIC (Resident Naval Officers or RNOs) at Kathiawar, Madras, Port Blair etc also played a vital role in the final outcome.

Therefore, it is only fair that when we recollect the 1971 war, we must do a wideangle commemoration. Just as our forebears did. Here, it bears recollection that it was the Senior Naval Officers Conference in May 1972, which decided that “Navy Day would be celebrated on 04 December to commemorate the very successful naval actions in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal during the India-Pakistan War of December 1971 (emphasis added) and the Navy Weekwould be observed from 01 to 07 December” (‘Transition to Triumph’, VAdm GM Hiranandani, p 384). It’s been so ever since. While many people erroneously link Navy Day to Op Trident it would be reductionist for us to situate the Navy Day to one operation. As I had written in an article elsewhere, “Thus, we may perceive the Navy Day to be ‘anchored in the daring attacks on Karachi on 04 Dec 71’ but covering the entire gamut of the Navy in the war”. (‘The origins of our Navy and genesis of Navy Day - an Overview’, Srikant Kesnur, Raksha Anirved, Dec 22). It is for this reason that my article last year for ‘First Strike’ focused on the unsung but noteworthy role of INS Vidyut in the conflict. It is in similar context that we must see Op Python and study its significance. While part of the same grand design, it ultimately tuned out to be a completely separate endeavour.

Setting the Stage

At some point during the war planning, the Naval authorities had decided on at least three waves of missile boat attacks on Karachi code named Trident, Python and Triumph with Trident to be the opening act and others to follow in quick succession.

As the planners did not have the luxury of knowing when the war would terminate

and the kind of battle damage the attacks would cause, the basic idea envisaged the

boats coming back to Mumbai to replenish the missiles and effect a turnaround for

the follow-on attacks if needed. As the Western Fleet also came to be aware of the enormous punch that Missile Boats could deliver, the Fleet Commander Rear Admiral EC (Chandy) Kuruvilla too pitched in for missile boats to be allocated to him for attacking the enemy. Accordingly, he was allocated INS Vijeta (CO and Div K 252 - Cdr AR Parti) and INS Vinash (CO - Lt Cdr Vijay Jerath) as part of his force toundertake Op Python while units under direct command of the FOCinC would execute Op Trident.

Commodore Vijay Jerath (Jerry), in his book ‘25th Missile Boat Squadron’ (Prakash Books, 2013) recollects that Chandy summoned him to the Fleet Office around 25 Nov and handed over the orders for ‘Op Python’ in a sealed envelope. Jerath read the ‘Top Secret’ orders and prepared the ship for the mission. The preparation included updating the chart folio with charts north of Okha, which the missile boats were not normally issued, without raising suspicion in the chart depot and having alternative plans for crew hygiene. The latter was necessitated by the fact that the meagre five tons of water that the ship carried would not suffice the crew of ‘33 odd’ for more than two days. Since the ship was going to be out for an unspecified number of days, several bottles of Dettol and cans of talcum powder were procured to keep the ships’ company ‘fresh and odourless’ at sea.

The Western Fleet sailed out on 02 Dec 1971 with Vijeta and Vinash in company. The plan was to tow the missile boats for greater part of the sortie and unleash them towards Karachi on the specified date. However, on 04 Dec, INS Vijeta had a breakdown and had to be towed back to harbour. That left Vinash alone with the Fleet. After the successful attack of 04 Dec, Naval authorities attempted conjoining INS Vidyut (the rearguard of the Trident force) with INS Vinash to maintain the force levels and undertake Op Python on 06 Dec. However, that could not happen due to various reasons – time and space, command and control issues between NHQ and HQWNC, Vidyut’s material issues, Admiral Nanda’s concern about Pakistan Airforce

likely to be mobilised for defence of Karachi and, above all, very rough sea conditions. Thus, that left Vinash alone to carry out Op Python.

The Python’s Choke

Consequently, from 02 to 08 Dec, Vinash remained with the Fleet sailing much seaward from coast than her other missile boat counterparts. During this time, she was sometimes towed and sometimes steaming, she was experiencing good seas and very rough ones. The small ship and her crew bore the conditions with cheer and josh. Jerath describes the harsh conditions of 06 Dec picturesquely when he said, “Vinash was rolling, pitching and corkscrewing like a buckaroo gone loco in a rodeo”. During this time the Rangout radar of Vinash was to prove a very useful AIO aid for the Fleet due to its ability to pick up contacts at much father range than what was available on the other Fleet ships at that time.

On 08 Dec, the day dawned bright and sea was smooth. Having fuelled Vinash, the Fleet Commander detached her for the mission. Vinash steamed past the flagship INS Mysore and headed towards Karachi with the Frigates Trishul (OTC) and Talwar in company. She carried out pre-launch checks and prepared herself for the task ahead. ETA at the launch point was planned before midnight so as to be outside 150 Nm radius from Karachi by dawn next day. At about sunset time, the Force encountered a ‘fishing boat’ which was, in reality, a forward deployed surveillance craft. Monitoring the enemy radio frequencies, the Task Force realised that their position was being reported to the Pakistani authorities. On directions from the OTC, INS Talwar promptly neutralised the ‘squealer’, as Jerry describes it.

Earlier on 06 Dec, the ship had an autopilot failure which was rectified after a few hours. On 08 Dec just after sunset Vinash had two shells jammed in the forward turret of AK 230 guns while carrying out loading. The shells were thrown overboard. Just as the ships company was hoping that there would be no more defects until mission completion, the ship experienced a total power breakdown at around 8.45 pm heading into the final phase of the launch. This was a major problem as the radar Rangout could not operate without power and hence, targeting data would not be available. While missiles could be fired using battery power, the range and bearing of targets would need to be indicated by ships in company. While doable, this was not the optimal method and the Commanding Officer and others were, no doubt, very worried about the outcome.

At about 2300 hrs (11.00 PM) electrical power was restored and a huge cheer went across the ship. There was no looking back from here. Soon, the Radar was switched on and targets plotted. As the ship had drifted few miles starboard (North North east) of track, she had the Kemari oil farm right ahead in her line of attack. Having closed Karachi more than expected – she was at about 12 NM from Karachi as Pakistan Navy accounts - there was no time to lose. After the final checks, Vinash launched her ‘pigeons’ beginning 11.15 PM. One by one, they homed on to their targets breathing fire and destruction. The first missile hit the Kemari Oil Field and set it ablaze again causing shock waves just when they seemed to be putting out the fires of the 04 Dec attack. The second missile hit and destroyed the Panamanian flagged vessel MV Gulf Star, the third missile hit and severely damaged the British vessel ‘MV Harmattan’ while the fourth one hit PNS Dacca, the PN tanker and rendered it hors de combat. The attack was swiftly completed by 11.30 PM and Vinash rushed back to join the formation.

They were greeted by a stirring signal from Trishul. It said, “From F 15 to Vinash: This is the best Diwali we have ever seen”. Later accounts tell us that this attack caused a huge impact. The magnitude of devastation was so large and unexpected that PN withdrew ships inside harbour and ordered them to de-ammunition after 08 Dec. That this decision continued to be debated later in Pakistan, as contributing to severely demoralising their Navy, in fact, illustrates the potency of the attack. PNS Dacca was laden with oil; while she barely managed to escape sinking, it severely dented Pak’s resources. The Kemari oil fields burned for days and severely aggravated fuel availability and, thereby, the war waging capability of Pakistan. Pakistan’s own naval history books recount that, “the flames shot up so high that Qamar house – a multistorey building in the city – was visible” and goes on to say that it was a “distressing sight for everyone no doubt but particularly for those who had risked their lives in a tenacious battle against the oil farms earlier”.

Pakistani losses were further exacerbated by the fact that when their guns opened fire on the withdrawing Trishul group, they ended up setting ablaze and sinking a Greek ship at anchorage MV Zoe. This recollection by Jerath of that night sums it up – “As I opened the door, the ships stern was swinging from northwest towards northeast and I was looking aft. The sight shocked me and for a moment I remained frozen on the ladder. The whole horizon from the North to the East was ablaze, with flames shooting 40 to 60 degrees skywards”.

True to its name, INS Vinash spelled destruction.

Vinash had one more scare during the withdrawal phase. Around midnight, she found that the sea water cooling intake pipes of her engines were choked with jelly fish which made it necessary for her to stop for 30 minutes to completely clear the pipes and then restart the engines. This was dangerous as she was still close to enemy waters. With Trishul and Talwar nearby, Vinash was able to shut her engines, resolve the issue and proceed at full speed after that. On the morning of 09 Dec, as her fuel tanks were running almost dry, Vinash was fuelled by INS Kadmatt. She was taken in tow on 10 Dec and entered Mumbai harbour along with the Fleet on 13 Dec, a full eleven days after she had sailed out. Vinash was given the honour of leading ships into harbour. In the words of Jerath, “As a Missile boat, Vinash had created a record of having spent over ten days out at sea – the longest time by any missile boat – without any mishap”. (P 213). The ship, like other units, remained stood to for more action till the end of the war. In fact, she had apparently been briefed by RAdm Kuruvilla about another attack with two other missile boats. The ceasefire and surrender in Dacca on 16 Dec brought the curtains down on the campaign and created, in its wake, the legend of ‘Killers’.

Significance of Op Python

The salient aspects and significance of Op Python are manifold. First, Vinash operated at sea for the longest period, in waters much seaward and experiencing greater vagaries of weather and sea conditions. The impact of that on engines, habitability, crew comfort and other equipment can only be imagined as such ships were typically meant for short, quick sorties. The fact that she encountered autopilot failure, jammed shells, total power failure, jelly fish clogging engine cooling pipes intake and almost ran out of fuel on the 09 Dec morning, illustrate the many challenges she had to overcome during the long sortie.

Second, Vinash came to be the only missile unit in her force. Her attack had to be super productive to become impactful. The Fleet Commander had taken an early call that she should expend all her missiles. Fortunately, all the missiles hit bull’s eye and the profound consequences of that have been brought out above. Third, with the surprise factor out of equation after Trident, the attack by Vinash happened when Pakistani forces were expecting more attacks and were more prepared. Admiral Nanda was very conscious of the enhanced security measures mounted by Pakistan and this was one of the contributory factors for postponement of the attack planned on 06 Dec. The threat was from various platforms - 16-inch guns in harbour, the surface craft patrolling at entrance, Pak submarines and its Air Force aircraft which were undertaking greater number of sorties into the sea.

INS Vinash at Vizag

The Western Fleet had correctly appreciated that approaches from Saurashtra would be under heavy surveillance, hence the Fleet Commander altered course of the formation much westward to launch an attack from west-southwest. While the Trishul group achieved a measure of tactical surprise in doing this, the fact that they were intercepted by the ‘fishing trawler’ which relayed their position to shore authorities brings out the challenges they could face. In fact, Trishul’s EW system reported that the Karachi radar had locked on to their group. Hence, they were running into many dangers. That Vinash ultimately had an unencumbered run owes as much to our

planning and daring as to Pakistan’s disrupted OODA loop in this conflict.

From 09 Dec as Pakistan naval units stayed in harbour and neutral merchant ships and aircraft started taking permission from Indian Navy to approach close to Karachi, the strangulation of west Pakistan was complete. The Indian Navy had achieved a virtual blockade without having to deploy too many maritime resources. In effect, the maritime war on the western front was effectively over within five days of commencement of the hostilities.

Decommissioning ceremony of INS Vinash

Conclusion

Operations Trident and Python were novel and daring operations which utilised missile boats to strike close at the enemy’s harbour – into his very citadel. While Indian Navy was quick to get off the blocks on 04 Dec it also sustained the momentum by following up with Op Python on 08 Dec which caused further destruction of Pakistani assets. To further compound their misery, the psychological fear of missile attacks resulted in abandonment of search for survivors, PNS Zulfikar being strafed by its own Air Force, MV Zoe being sunk by its shore guns and the spectacle of all their ships being pigeonholed in harbour. Cumulatively, they rendered Op Triumph redundant. The exploits of the Indian Navy and the 25th Missile Boat Squadron, more popularly known as the Killer Squadron, during the 1971 Indo-Pak War are ingrained in the collective memory of India, Pakistan and the world at large. Be it the foresight in acquiring the missile boats from the Soviet Union or the courage of the daring men behind the machine, every element was vital for achieving this unimaginable task. The damage wreaked by the missile boats was far reaching – they not only debilitated the enemy’s war fighting capability but also sapped their spirit and adversely impacted their morale. With these attacks the young Indian Navy had earned its spurs and come of age. To summarise, it may be said that the Python’s choke was as deadly as the Trident’s strike. If the latter landed the first staggering blows, the former delivered the knockout punch.

For the trivia buffs we conclude with this interesting nugget of information. INS Vinash was the first missile boat to be commissioned on 20 Jan 1971 at Kolkata. The Commanding Officer Lt Cdr Vijay Jerath was awarded the Vir Chakra for his leadership and the ship’s heroic exploits. Few key officers and sailors were also awarded other decorations. The Executive Officer of INS Vinash, Lt Achyut M Gokhale, fondly called ‘Professor’, was ‘Mentioned in Dispatches’ for his role in the war. A Short Service Commission officer, Gokhale after serving in the Navy, went on to join the IAS in 1973 and is fondly remembered as a fine officer and visionary who transformed village administration especially in Nagaland. Gokhale passed away few years ago, in April 2021.

31 December 1989 : Ship's company, INS Vinash

Tail Piece

The war hero Vinash (K 85) was decommissioned on 31 Dec 1989 after serving the nation for nearly two decades. She went out with style. My coursemate and friend Capt Ashok Sharma (Retd), who as a young Lieutenant was the last Missile Gunnery Officer (MGO) of the ship, recollects with pride that Vinash undertook a successful missile firing (PMF) in her very last sea sortie in Oct 1989. Having made a statement she returned to Vishakhapatnam harbour, where she was then based, facing turbulent seas which washed sea water up her foxle. The crew were continuously mopping water off the deck for many hours. Maybe the old girl was reminiscing her memorable voyage of Dec 1971 and reminding the crew of her legacy.

Her new avatar, now with pennant number K 47, was reborn on November 20, 1993, commissioned as a Veer-class corvette, under the command of Lt Cdr (later Vice Adm) AK Chawla. It has the distinction of being indigenously built and is, in fact, the first missile vessel to be built at Goa shipyard. It is designed for coastal patrol, missile strikes and other naval duties. Almost double the tonnage, one and half times the length and more formidable than its predecessor, the new Vinash has been part of Operation Vijay (1999 – Kargil War), Operation Parakram (2001–02) and several other important missions, including being forward deployed after the attacks on Uri and the clashes at Galwan. More importantly, she has served for 32 years nurturing a new generation of naval leadership.

Admiral DK Tripathi, the current Chief of Naval Staff and Vice Admiral Krishna Swaminathan, the current FOCinC, WNC are among those who figure in the list of its illustrious Commanding Officers. The motto of the ship ‘Invincible in Battle’, continues from the predecessor to successor and takes the tradition forward through the ages.

References. While the texture and flavour of the article have been derived from the

numerous interactions that this author has had with various veterans who were

involved in the 1971 war or who have knowledge of the same, as well as my own

writings, talks and social media posts on the subject, the two main books referred to

for quotes and factual data are as follows:

1. ‘Transition to Triumph – Indian Navy 1965 -1975’ by VAdm GM Hiranandani, Lancer, 2000.

2. ‘25th Missile Boat Squadron – An Untold Story’ by Cmde Vijay Jerath, Prakash Books, 2013.

   Photo Credits - Cmde Vijay Jerath, VrC (Retd), Capt Ashok Sharma (Retd).